In the three weeks following the U.S. takeover, unchecked looting effectively gutted every important public institution in the city—with the notable exception of the Oil Ministry.
– Peter Galbraith, former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia17
Stuff happens… Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things.
– Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, on the looting in Iraq18
Occupation law clearly requires an Occupying Power to safeguard property, and particularly institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, and health and public welfare. In effect, the Occupying Power steps into the shoes of the previous government and assumes full responsibility for preventing looting and maintaining public order. U.S. occupation forces have utterly failed to fulfill this duty.
In the first two weeks of April 2003, every aspect of Iraq’s vital infrastructure was ransacked, including ministries, museums, libraries, hospitals, electric plants, schools and universities.19 Despite advance warnings from NGOs, UN agencies, and even internal government reports,20 U.S. forces failed to protect these properties even when physically present at the scene.21 There are documented reports of occupation troops actually encouraging looters.22 Losses were extensive, including irreplaceable cultural heritage, vital public records, and physical infrastructure necessary to maintain life-saving services.23 The entire affair was experienced by many Iraqis as a public humiliation that also set back efforts to rebuild the country. The looting of essential infrastructure continues even today, with water, electrical, and other facilities being stripped and their parts transported to Jordan to be sold as scrap.24
The Occupying Power is also responsible for ensuring public safety on a daily basis. Yet the U.S. created the conditions for increased crime and lawlessness by summarily dismissing the entire Iraqi army, police, and security forces shortly after the war – without a back-up plan for maintaining order.25 The predictable and well-documented result has been a sharp rise in violent crime, including revenge killing, rape, kidnapping, theft, and sexual crime.26 Women are most at risk, with little hope of obtaining justice when victimized.27 The breakdown in public safety was entirely foreseeable. One can imagine what would happen in any American city if all governing authorities, including law enforcement, were suddenly eliminated, at a time when most of the population was experiencing desperate poverty.
17 James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, Jan/Feb. 2004. http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/fallows.htm.
18 Sean Loughlin, “Rumsfeld on Looting in Iraq: ‘Stuff Happens’,” CNN, April 12, 2003. http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/.
19 Amnesty International, Iraq: Looting, lawlessness and humanitarian consequences, April 11, 2003. AI Index: MDE14/085/2003, at http://www.web.amnesty.org/pages/irq-engmde140852003.
20 Fallows, ibid.
21 Amnesty International, ibid.
22 David Enders, “Getting Back on the Grid,” Baghdad Bulletin, June 10, 2003. http://www.baghdadbulletin.com/pageArticle.php?article_id=18&cat_id=7.
23 Ken Guggenheim, “Iraq’s Looting Appears More Serious Year after War,” Associated Press, March 14, 2004. http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2004/03/14/382373-ap.html.
24 James Glanz, “In the Scrapyards of Jordan, Signs of a Looted Iraq,” New York Times, May 28, 2004.
25 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Violence blamed on US decision to disband Iraq army,” The Guardian , April 7, 2004. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1187360,00.html.
26 Human Rights Watch, Sidelined: Human Rights in Postwar Iraq, January 26, 2004. http://hrw.org/wr2k4/6.htm#_Toc58744955.
27 Human Rights Watch, Climate of Fear: Sexual Violence and Abduction of Women and Girls in Baghdad, July 16, 2003. http://hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq0703/.