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Day 1. August 3

The fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee opened in New York this week, and for the first time delegations are working from a full draft treaty. The Co-Leads released their zero draft on 21 July — twenty-six articles covering everything from the allocation of taxing rights to the taxation of high-net-worth individuals, illicit financial flows, and the machinery that will govern the Convention once it exists. Over the next two weeks, governments will decide how much of it survives.

Day one was spent almost entirely on Articles 1 and 2: the objectives and the guiding principles. These are short provisions, but they are the interpretive anchors for everything that follows — and, crucially, they carry the commitment to align international tax cooperation with States' obligations under international human rights law. That principle was hard-won during the Terms of Reference negotiations in 2024, and CESR has argued since that it is the entry point for the issues squeezed out of the ToR: extraterritorial obligations, progressivity, gender.

Holding the line

The dominant dynamic of the day was defensive, and it came from the Global South. Speaking for the African Group, Zambia was unambiguous: Articles 1 and 2 reproduce what the General Assembly already agreed, the ToR were substantively negotiated, and reopening them now would mean losing sight of what the Convention was created to achieve. Nigeria described the ToR as the constitution of this process. Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania, Algeria and Burkina Faso followed, joined by the African Union and ATAF. India made a sharp structural argument by saying that each subparagraph of Article 2 connects to a concrete tax deliverable, which is precisely why these are operative provisions and not preambular context. Brazil, Russia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia supported retaining the text. The Chair reinforced the point, noting that the objectives and principles were extracted directly from a ToR adopted by the UNGA.

The pushback

The counter-pressure was equally coordinated. Ireland, speaking for the EU27, called for the Convention to build on rather than replace the existing architecture, for the Conference of the States Parties to remain facilitative, for the Secretariat's role to stay limited, and for consensus on anything affecting the rights or obligations of Parties. The UK, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Italy, Austria and Luxembourg aligned. Norway questioned whether "fairness" carries legal meaning at all. Germany went furthest, arguing the instrument should contain objectives and principles rather than binding obligations of uncertain scope.

Two further moves deserve watching. Belgium proposed a standalone article on tax sovereignty modelled on the UN Convention against Corruption, picked up by Czechia, Sweden, Korea and Colombia. And Czechia and Estonia both suggested the ToR are merely a recommendation the INC may depart from — a direct challenge to the Global South's central argument of the day.

On human rights

The pressure on Article 2(c) arrived as redefinition. The International Chamber of Commerce welcomed the human rights reference and then argued that taxpayer rights and procedural safeguards should sit alongside it in the guiding principles. UN Independent Expert Attiya Waris named the risk directly: the draft does not unpack what international human rights law means here, and that silence is what invited taxpayer rights onto the floor.

Civil society pushed back by arguing that Article 11 devotes detailed text to protecting confidentiality while human rights receive a single vague line; a draft that, as it stands, protects the privacy of the powerful better than the rights of everyone else. The ILO proposed strengthening Article 1(c) with language on consistency with UN human rights instruments and the progressive extension of social protection floors.

There were openings. Sweden welcomed Article 2(c) and asked that gender equality be added to 2(d). Brazil said that if the article were reopened, it would add progressivity and broad-based taxation, and later called for coherence with human rights and common but differentiated responsibilities. Jamaica pressed for CBDR and environmental commitments. Mexico insisted the negotiation process itself must meet the fairness and transparency standards the Convention proclaims.

Discussion moved to Articles 4 and 5 on sustainable development and fair allocation of tax rights as the day closed.

Day 2. August 4

Tuesday took delegations into the substance: fair allocation of taxing rights, high-net-worth individuals, illicit financial flows, and harmful tax practices. Four articles, one pattern. On each, the zero draft has softened since the January and February versions — and on each, the same coalition arrived to defend the softening in the language of legal certainty.

Article 5: the heart of the Convention

The African Union put it plainly. Article 5 (fair allocation of taxing rights on multinational enterprises) is not one provision among many; it is the assurance that countries where wealth is genuinely generated will get to tax it, and it is why delegations came to New York in the first place. Africa, the AU said, has already had decades of exploration. What it wants now are commitments.

The draft does not yet supply them. Two changes drew the most fire. First, "economic activity" has disappeared from the list of nexus factors in paragraph 1 — India called it the loss of the anchor on source jurisdiction, and China, Kenya, Zambia (for the African Group), Jamaica and Norway all asked for its return. Second, the factors are joined by "and" rather than "or", which would make them cumulative. India, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Kenya and the African Group want that fixed.

"Real economic contribution" produced an unusual convergence. Senegal argued that speculative finance is not real economic activity and the qualifier invites confusion; Jamaica warned that capital-exporting countries could claim to be the real source of contribution. Switzerland and Estonia also want "real" deleted, but for the opposite reason, that it creates uncertainty.

The deeper fight is over paragraph 2. Zambia, for the African Group, called the language "explore and pursue" too soft to carry any commitment, and announced a resubmission adding a third paragraph on concrete measures: domestic law, protocols, and the renegotiation of tax treaties. The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) was blunt — without treaty renegotiation, it does not see how fair allocation happens at all. Germany, by contrast, welcomed the removal of the renegotiation requirement as an improvement. Algeria contended that without that mechanism, existing asymmetries would stay in place.

Brazil reassured the room that Article 5 creates no immediate obligation and does not directly affect treaties. Denmark thanked Brazil for the clarification and used it to press its own case. Switzerland's proposal for ‘informal-informals’ discussion on Article 5 was widely supported.

Article 6: sovereignty as a blocking device

On high-net-worth individuals, the diagnosis was near-unanimous among Global South delegations: the article has been watered down. Paragraph 1 language "cooperate to enhance" should return to "develop and implement" (African Group, India, Brazil, Kenya, Ghana, Morocco, Pakistan, Honduras, South Africa, ATAF). The word "general" in paragraph 2 unduly restricts what information can be shared and should go. And "explore" in paragraph 3 should become "adopt".

The new sovereignty clause at the end of paragraph 3 became the day's flashpoint. Belgium proposed a standalone sovereignty article modelled on the Convention against Corruption, and was backed by Germany, Estonia, Austria, France, Switzerland, Korea, Sweden, Poland, Ireland and others. Africa Group members answered that Article 2(b) already covers it and that repeating it article by article undermines each provision. Nigeria sharply underscored that a treaty means agreeing to override domestic law, so states are already surrendering sovereignty by signing.

Two interventions worth carrying forward. Mexico observed that the article treats high-net-worth individuals solely through avoidance and evasion, when the point is ensuring they pay their fair share and reforming tax systems accordingly. Spain asked that taxation under paragraph 3 be not only effective but progressive.

Articles 7 and 8 (Illicit financial flows, tax avoidance, tax evasion, harmful tax practices)

The afternoon turned on one word: illicit. A large bloc of European states, joined by Japan, Korea and Singapore, wants tax avoidance removed from the definition on the grounds that avoidance is lawful. Nigeria and ATAF answered that illicit is deliberately broader than illegal — the largest losses to developing-country treasuries come from arrangements lawful at every step. Brazil floated a possible landing zone: list avoidance, evasion and illicit flows as parallel items rather than subspecies.

Article 8 opened late. India proposed language on practices that erode the tax base of other countries. Discussion continues Wednesday.

Day 3, August 6

Wednesday moved through harmful tax practices, dispute resolution, mutual administrative assistance, exchange of information and capacity building. Main discussions revolved around who sets the standards, who can opt out, and which articles survive at all.

Article 8 (harmful tax practices)

The unresolved question is whether this Convention defers to work already done elsewhere. Czechia, Thailand, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Singapore, Israel, the UAE, Korea, Japan, Norway, Portugal, France and Sweden all pressed some version of the same argument: recognise existing standards, avoid duplication, fill gaps rather than start from zero. Switzerland proposed flipping "develop and apply" to "apply and further develop", a small edit that signals a large effect.

The African Group answered on legitimacy rather than efficiency. Zambia, in a pragmatic move, suggested looking at existing work, keeping the good, and getting rid of the bad — but do not write a reference into the article that assumes every state here belongs to the forum that produced it (OECD). Nigeria noted the Terms of Reference nowhere instruct the Committee to adopt other bodies' instruments, and that the UN's umbrella is big enough for everyone. South Africa added that universal participation is what produces universal acceptability. India and Honduras asserted that where existing work was developed transparently and non-discriminatorily with all states able to contribute, it can stand; where it was not, this is the inclusive forum to continue.

Mauritius, Kenya and Zambia want the criteria for identifying and monitoring harmful practices set by the Conference of the States Parties, and "explore" replaced with "adopt". Mauritius noted aptly that transparency here is about tax regimes, not about taxpayers.

Kenya, Zambia, South Africa and the African Union resisted setting aside time for informal-informals on Article 5, with several articles still undiscussed, delegations due to leave at the end of the week, and member states running different delegates across workstreams. When the schedule shifts, dilution of texts becomes more likely.

Article 9 (mutual administrative assistance)

The African Group wants the article split into three paragraphs, with a third anchoring future mechanisms, and the qualifier "in accordance with their needs, capacities and priorities" deleted as a weakening device. Mauritius, Brazil and Cameroon agreed. India asked that the article specify cross-border disputes and name domestic resource mobilisation as the goal, and that paragraph 2(b) stop at "timely manner", since the trailing reference to taxpayers and tax authorities creates a right. The International Chamber of Commerce intervened specifically to keep that reference. Nigeria, Kenya and the African Union want "transparent" added.

Germany, speaking both as a delegation and as co-lead of Protocol 2, defended the "needs, capacities and priorities" language on the grounds that it preserves the optionality of protocol measures. The tactic seems to be to introduce procedural justifications to diminish commitments.

Articles 10 and 11 (exchange of information; data collection and analysis)

Switzerland stated it could not adhere to the Convention as presented unless reservations were permitted on mutual administrative assistance. Israel, Austria, Estonia, Belgium, Japan, Korea, Norway, Cambodia, Czechia and Ireland followed. Belgium noted openly that Article 25 forecloses reservations while other UN conventions allow them.

On Article 11, a large bloc moved to delete the exchange-of-information provision outright as too detailed for a framework convention. The African Group, Nigeria, the African Union, ATAF, India, Russia and CEDD resisted such a proposal by stating that deletion would either leave gaps or force EOI references back into every article, fragmenting the text. Senegal, speaking earlier on Article 10, averred that requests refused on foreseeable-relevance grounds would force countries to wait out foreign domestic procedures. Brazil signalled flexibility, noting 59 UN member states are outside the existing multilateral instrument.

Article 12 (capacity building and technical assistance)

Capacity building opened late, with Czechia and Germany pressing for assistance to remain voluntary and China asking that "shall" be deleted. ATAF countered that the article does not yet cover capacity to implement the Convention itself.

Day 4. August 6

Thursday was governance day. Having spent three days on what the Convention would commit states to do, delegations turned to the machinery that would make it happen: the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies, the data it would collect, the secretariat that would serve it, and the money that would pay for all of it. These are the articles that determine whether the substantive commitments become live obligations or remain declarations. They produced the session's clearest split — and, unexpectedly, its broadest agreement.

Article 13: how much power for the Conference of the Parties?

Article 13 establishes the Conference of the Parties, the body of all member states that will meet periodically to steer the Convention, adopt protocols and oversee implementation. Germany opened by observing that the draft is institutionally leaner and narrower than comparable UN conventions, and argued that the Conference should facilitate implementation without becoming a mechanism for expanding obligations beyond what states agreed. Italy invoked the constitutional principle of legality in tax matters, which in its view prevents an international body from creating new tax liabilities. Ireland, Spain, Malta, Luxembourg, Portugal and Belgium made versions of the same argument. Belgium was candid about why it matters so much to them: because the Convention permits no reservations, states are uncertain about the scope of what they would be signing.

The African Group answered that an organ described is not an organ empowered — the African Union's phrase. Kenya, speaking for its 54 members, asked that the Conference be named the supreme organ of the Convention and its protocols, meet at least annually, adopt its own financial rules, and have an explicit mandate over subsidiary bodies and protocols. India, Russia, Brazil and Honduras agreed that this is the one article that cannot remain high-level. ATAF flagged a drafting inconsistency worth fixing: the text calls the body a Conference of the State Parties in Article 13 and a Conference of the Parties in Article 20.

The one point of agreement

On stakeholder participation, the room converged almost completely. Germany, Czechia, the UK, Jamaica, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, France, Estonia, Malta, Mexico, Brazil, the EU, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, the African Group, the African Union and ATAF all called for observer provisions modelled on existing UN practice — most often Article 63 of the Convention against Corruption.

The moment that crystallized it came from civil society. Speaking for the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the delegate invited the room to turn around and look at the organizations seated behind them, then made the point plainly: this negotiation has been participatory, but the institutions that will govern the Convention are silent on participation. What delegates saw behind them has no assured place once the treaty enters into force. Greenpeace and the Global Alliance for Tax Justice added that limiting the Conference's powers misunderstands what it is — the Conference cannot exceed what parties decide, because the Conference is the parties.

Decision-making, and a clarification that mattered

The African Group, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, the African Union and ATAF want decisions taken by simple majority, following established UN rules. Most European states, with Japan and Korea, want consensus. Côte d'Ivoire proposed a middle route: consensus as the governing principle, qualified majority when it fails. Brazil asked the obvious question about amendments — if the Convention itself is not adopted by consensus, why should changes to it be?

The Secretariat then supplied the decisive technical point. Where an instrument is silent on decision-making, established practice is consensus. Silence, in other words, is not neutral. If the African Group wants majority voting, it has to be written into the text.

Articles 14 to 18

Article 14 covers subsidiary bodies. India proposed a two-tier structure of technical working groups reporting through an intermediate committee, with rotating membership. The African Group wants specific bodies created now — on tax treaties, dispute resolution and the digital economy — and Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire objected that the draft's first report is not due until 2035.

Articles 15 and 16, on data collection and on reviewing implementation, drew safeguard-based caution from Singapore, Israel, Austria, Germany and Norway. Articles 17 and 18 exposed the financing gap: Côte d'Ivoire noted the financial provision is nearly identical to the tobacco convention's and rests on voluntary funding, which it called unpredictable and risky. Brazil and Kenya pressed for assessed contributions and a dedicated fund. Discussion closed on protocols and amendments.